Looking Back to the Future of Cyberspace Warfare: Case Studies of Military Operations, Russian Attack on Georgia, U.S. Surge in Iraq, Attack on Iran Nuclear Facility, Land, Maritime, Air Theories

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This report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. To some, the term cyberspace is a daunting term. For U.S. military leaders, cyberspace needs to be embraced and understood in order to effectively integrate the capabilities offered in and through cyberspace with all military operations. Cyberspace should be viewed as another domain in which to operate, in other words a different or additional battlespace. Cyberspace should also be viewed as providing additional capabilities to military leaders to conduct warfare. By embracing, understanding, and integrating cyberspace military leaders have additional actions to sequence in time, space, and purpose in order to reach desired strategic objectives. Some define this sequencing of actions as operational art. There is current U.S. military doctrine describing the integration of cyberspace into military operations, but the doctrine is not routinely practiced or understood. Instead cyberspace is normally treated as a niche subject that is hard to comprehend. On the other end of the spectrum, there are those that view cyberspace as the primary means of waging future conflicts with the term cyberwar being used. By analyzing history and the evolution of military theory in other military domains, one can see connections to the way in which cyberspace is evolving as well.

In order to integrate military actions in all domains toward a strategic goal, it is imperative to understand the idea of operational art. Operational art is the connection between strategy and tactical actions. More specifically, operational art entails sequencing tactical actions in time, space, and purpose to meet strategic objectives. In contemporary times, this will include actions carried out in cyberspace. Cyberspace capabilities, as presented in Joint Publication (JP) 3-12, are limited in military operations because they are not routinely practiced or understood. Most operational-level planners feel the capabilities are too complex, or incorrectly believe that they do not have the authority to employ cyber weapons in current operations.4 Therefore, demonstration of operational art in and through cyberspace is limited or nonexistent.

The U.S. military trains personnel focused on conducting tactical actions in the cyberspace domain, but education in this domain remains a niche subject at military service-level schools, essentially ignored in pursuit of more traditional subjects.5 More emphasis is required at the service-level schools, allowing the U.S. military to advance the integration of cyberspace as well as better educate military leaders on national capabilities available to support these operations. Education at service-level schools should provide the link between tactical actions and strategic objectives in order to advance the practice of operational art. Training, education, and doctrine in other domains have gone through their own maturity process before full integration into combined arms operations. The advancement of doctrine and complete integration of cyberspace will produce enhanced results in the conduct of all future military operations.