No Sense in Dwelling on the Past? The Fate of the U.S. Air Force's German Air Force Monograph Project, 1952-69, World War II von Rohden and Karlsruhe Projects, Bundesluftwaffe, Effects on NATO

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This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. This book examines the German air force (GAF) monograph project, also known as the Karlsruhe project, through which the US Air Force employed former Luftwaffe generals to record the history of World War II from the German perspective. Historians have explored parallel programs in the US Army and Navy, but the Karlsruhe project has received little attention. However, the Air Force monographs have proven useful to historians because of their high quality.

This book attributes the Karlsruhe monographs' strength as works of history primarily to the Air Force's limited interest in them, which insulated the writers from outside pressure to produce studies of immediate utility to the military. Whereas policy needs drove the Army and Navy programs and often caused them to search for convenient tactical "lessons" in German history, the GAF monograph project was effectively autonomous. This was a mixed blessing. Chronically undermanned and inadequately funded, the project ended with most studies still unfinished. The Air Force ignored the monographs and failed to benefit from the experience of the Luftwaffe.

This book illustrates the inherent tensions in writing official military history and utilizes the Karlsruhe project as a lens to examine problems plaguing the Air Force during the early Cold War. Still, cooperative historical work proved to be an inexpensive and unexpected way of cementing the critical West German-American military alliance, and both air forces came to value this aspect of the project more than the historical studies it produced.

CHAPTER 1 - AN OVERVIEW OF AMERICAN WORLD WAR II OFFICIAL MILITARY HISTORY PROJECTS * The von Rohden Project (1945-47) * The Naval Historical Team, Bremerhaven (1949-52) * The US Army's German Military History Program (1945-61) * CHAPTER 2 - CHRONOLOGY OF THE KARLSRUHE PROJECT (1952-69) * Stepchild of the Army's History Program * Topic Selection and the Prioritization of Soviet Studies * Assignment of Key Personnel and Early Research Obstacles * Documentary Sources Become Available, 1954 * Personnel Issues Arising from the Late Start of the Karlsruhe Project * A Second Full-Time USAF Employee Comes Aboard, 1955 * The Final Phase: 10 Years, One Editor, and 40 Drafts * CHAPTER 3 - THE "UNFORESEEN BY-PRODUCT": TOWARDS A NEW WEST GERMAN-AMERICAN AIR FORCE RELATIONSHIP * Demilitarization, the "Economic Miracle," and Historical Programs * West German Rearmament * Effects on the NATO Alliance * A Historical Program Director as Air Attache * The West German Officer Education System Takes Shape * The USAF Extends the Project at the Request of the Bundesluftwaffe, 1957 * Relational Rearmament * CHAPTER 4 - INSULATED BUT IGNORED: THE MUTED AIR FORCE RESPONSE TO THE KARLSRUHE PROJECT * The Influence of Rapid Technological Change * The Era of Air Force Dominance and Doctrinal Stagnation * Delays Contribute to Loss of Air Force Interest * The Karlsruhe Project's View of Its Own Role * Avoiding the Pitfalls of Army History * Vietnam Parallels: "Lessons" Lost? * Jumping to the Wrong Conclusion * CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSION

This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. This book examines the German air force (GAF) monograph project, also known as the Karlsruhe project, through which the US Air Force employed former Luftwaffe generals to record the history of World War II from the German perspective. Historians have explored parallel programs in the US Army and Navy, but the Karlsruhe project has received little attention. However, the Air Force monographs have proven useful to historians because of their high quality.

This book attributes the Karlsruhe monographs' strength as works of history primarily to the Air Force's limited interest in them, which insulated the writers from outside pressure to produce studies of immediate utility to the military. Whereas policy needs drove the Army and Navy programs and often caused them to search for convenient tactical "lessons" in German history, the GAF monograph project was effectively autonomous. This was a mixed blessing. Chronically undermanned and inadequately funded, the project ended with most studies still unfinished. The Air Force ignored the monographs and failed to benefit from the experience of the Luftwaffe.

This book illustrates the inherent tensions in writing official military history and utilizes the Karlsruhe project as a lens to examine problems plaguing the Air Force during the early Cold War. Still, cooperative historical work proved to be an inexpensive and unexpected way of cementing the critical West German-American military alliance, and both air forces came to value this aspect of the project more than the historical studies it produced.

CHAPTER 1 - AN OVERVIEW OF AMERICAN WORLD WAR II OFFICIAL MILITARY HISTORY PROJECTS * The von Rohden Project (1945-47) * The Naval Historical Team, Bremerhaven (1949-52) * The US Army's German Military History Program (1945-61) * CHAPTER 2 - CHRONOLOGY OF THE KARLSRUHE PROJECT (1952-69) * Stepchild of the Army's History Program * Topic Selection and the Prioritization of Soviet Studies * Assignment of Key Personnel and Early Research Obstacles * Documentary Sources Become Available, 1954 * Personnel Issues Arising from the Late Start of the Karlsruhe Project * A Second Full-Time USAF Employee Comes Aboard, 1955 * The Final Phase: 10 Years, One Editor, and 40 Drafts * CHAPTER 3 - THE "UNFORESEEN BY-PRODUCT": TOWARDS A NEW WEST GERMAN-AMERICAN AIR FORCE RELATIONSHIP * Demilitarization, the "Economic Miracle," and Historical Programs * West German Rearmament * Effects on the NATO Alliance * A Historical Program Director as Air Attache * The West German Officer Education System Takes Shape * The USAF Extends the Project at the Request of the Bundesluftwaffe, 1957 * Relational Rearmament * CHAPTER 4 - INSULATED BUT IGNORED: THE MUTED AIR FORCE RESPONSE TO THE KARLSRUHE PROJECT * The Influence of Rapid Technological Change * The Era of Air Force Dominance and Doctrinal Stagnation * Delays Contribute to Loss of Air Force Interest * The Karlsruhe Project's View of Its Own Role * Avoiding the Pitfalls of Army History * Vietnam Parallels: "Lessons" Lost? * Jumping to the Wrong Conclusion * CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSION

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